No proof for subjective experience in insects
Animal Sentience August 19, 2016 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1146 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis commentary extends Klein and Barron's comparison of human and insect cognition to robots, raising two objections. One objection concerns the epistemological problem of subjective experience, questioning whether robots can possess it. The other objection challenges whether insects require integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation, suggesting simpler mechanisms may suffice. The authors argue that these points undermine the claim that insects and robots share functionally equivalent cognitive processes.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that two objections—one about subjective experience in robots and one about the necessity of integrated spatiotemporal modeling for insect navigation—challenge the view that insects and robots share functionally equivalent cognitive processes. |
Abstract
Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.