Merleau-Ponty on Meaning and Motivation
Arnaud Petit
September 30, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197925300.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Merleau-Ponty's conception of perceptual content can reconstruct linguistic meanings and conceptual contents from materials that do not presuppose them, and that perceptually disclosed practical meanings motivate action in a way that is neither rational nor merely causal. The author defends these claims against objections and links them to objectivity and guidance conditions. |
Abstract
Abstract To be partially reductive, an account of rule-following needs to reconstruct facts about linguistic meanings, conceptual contents, and their understanding out of materials that do not presuppose such meanings and contents. In this chapter, it is suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of perceptual content, as laid out in the Phenomenology of Perception, can help in that endeavour. His suggestion that practical meanings are given to us in perception is teased out. Likewise, his suggestion that, when they are perceptually disclosed to us, such meanings are motivational in a way that is neither rational nor merely causal. These two conceptual moves are substantiated, and a number of potential objections are pre-emptively raised and answered. The conceptual moves are further related to the objectivity and guidance conditions first discussed in the Introduction. The chapter concludes with some reflexions on Merleau-Ponty’s conception of phenomenology and its apparent affinities with Wittgenstein’s quietism.