Technologies of the extended mind: Defining the issues
Peter B. Reiner, Saskia K Nagel
Oxford Scholarship Online September 21, 2017 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198786832.003.0006 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that everyday information technologies function as technologies of the extended mind, not merely cognitive supports, and that this distinction has substantial implications for neuroethics. Contends that concepts of autonomy, privacy of thought, and cognitive enhancement require a new framework that considers an expanded concept of mind rather than only technology's effects on the brain. |
Abstract
Living in the modern world entails substantial interaction with information technologies. The ways in which people interact with these devices—how they enter into daily practices—has become so profound that they qualify as technologies of the extended mind. This chapter distinguishes between these devices acting as cognitive support versus becoming bona fide extensions of our minds, and argues that this latter, new reality has substantial implications for the field of neuroethics. As exemplars, the implications of these technologies of the extended mind for concepts of autonomy and privacy of thought, as well as for the debate regarding cognitive enhancement, are investigated. The chapter calls for a new framework for thinking about neuroethics for technology that takes into account not just the effects of technology upon the brain, but one that also includes a more expansive concept of the mind.