Emptying Consciousness: Functionalism

The author argues that both biological (causal) and computational theories of consciousness reduce the mind to input/output relations, stripping it of traditional mental contents and inwardness. In the biological model, consciousness is merely a link in causal chains between perception and action; in the computational model, it is a site for rule-governed formula transformations. Both approaches treat the mind as a through road rather than a dwelling, voiding consciousness of any intrinsic space or interiority.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The biological (causal) and computational theories of consciousness have the common outcome of reducing mind to a set of input/output relations. In the biological model, the emphasis is on the causal links between perception and its external occasions — the objects of perception — and active peripherals such as muscles and glands. In the computer model, the emphasis is on computational procedures whose essence is the rule-governed transformation of formulae into other formulae. In both cases, consciousness is curiously emptied. Traditional mental contents disappear and the mind itself becomes an unremarkable and unspecial site in causal chains and computational procedures that begin before consciousness and extend beyond it. Indeed, mind is scarcely a locus in its own right and certainly does not have its own space. It is a through road (or a small part of one) rather than a dwelling. Consciousness is voided of inwardness.