Reappraising intuitions about consciousness.

Abstract

Scientific studies of consciousness derive their legitimacy from individuals’ intuitions about the degree to which measured functions can be associated with consciousness. However, intuitions about consciousness are often regarded as inherently inaccurate and unreliable, as evidenced by cases that appear to reveal counterintuitive dissociations between consciousness and functions. Recent findings challenge this traditional interpretation, suggesting that such cases can be explained by partial awareness that aligns with our intuitions. In this article, we integrate these findings and argue that intuitions about consciousness are more accurate and reliable than previously assumed. Furthermore, by adopting the perspective that consciousness is a metacognitive model of internal representations, we propose that intuitions about consciousness are metacognitive models of the relationship between internal representations and functions. This functional reframing not only explains why intuitions about consciousness can be accurate and reliable but also facilitates systematic investigations by linking them to well-studied cognitive functions, such as confidence, target templates, attention modes, and awareness of absence.