Quantum randomness and free will
Chetan S. Mandayam Nayakar, R. Srikanth
arXiv (Cornell University) November 22, 2010 preprint DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1011.4898 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes that free will can be "weakly" compatible with physical law by altering outcome probabilities, and that in quantum systems this would appear as wave-function collapse deviating from the Born rule. Argues such deviations imply the brain may host exotic physics, distinguish human free will from particle behavior in the Free Will Theorem, and explain why standard AI cannot recreate free will or consciousness. |
Abstract
Both deterministic and indeterministic physical laws are incompatible with control by genuine (non-illusory) free will. We propose that an indeterministic dynamics can be $weakly$ compatible with free will (FW), whereby the latter acts by altering the probability distribution over allowed outcomes. In the quantum physical world, such a FW can collapse the wave function, introducing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, this deviation would stand in conflict with both special relativity and (a variant of) the Strong Church-Turing thesis, implying that the brain may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice, these deviations would not be directly or easily observable, because they occur in sub-neuronal superpositions in the brain, where they would be shrouded in random measurement errors, noise and statistical fluctuations. Our result elucidates the difference between the FW of human observers and that of observed particles in the Free Will Theorem. This difference is a basic reason for why FW (and, in general, consciousness) cannot be recreated by standard artificial intelligence (AI) technology. We propose various neurobiological experiments to test our proposed theory. We speculate that for observers to be aware of a physical theory such as quantum mechanics, FW is necessary and that the theory must therefore not be universal. We suggest that FW may be regarded as a primitive principle in Nature for explaining quantum indeterminism.