The obscurity of the physical: an objection to Chalmers’ conceivability argument

A zombie world is one where all microphysical facts match our world but no one is conscious; a zombie is an individual without conscious experience despite identical microphysics; an inverted has qualitatively different experiences. The first premise of Chalmers' conceivability argument against materialism holds that such scenarios are ideally conceivable. This paper rejects that premise, arguing that current physics provides no clear concept of the physical to contrast with the non-physical, so zombie worlds, zombies, and inverts are only prima facie conceivable, not ideally conceivable—the Obscurity of the Physical Objection.

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Abstract

A zombie world is a possible world in which all the microphysical truths are identical to the truths in our world, but no one is phenomenally conscious. A zombie is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who has none of the phenomenal conscious experiences of the individual in our world. An inverted is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are not only identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who also has phenomenal conscious experiences. These experiences, however, are qualitatively different from the ones of the individual in our world. The first premise of Chalmers’ conceivability argument against materialism is that a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are ideally conceivable. This paper rejects this premise in claiming that: given that current physics does not allow philosophers to establish a clear concept of the physical that could be opposed to something else non-physical, a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are merely prima facie, but not ideally conceivable. This objection is called the Obscurity of the Physical Objection. Key-words: Zombies, qualia, conceivability, possibility, physics.