Kripke on Functionalism
Crítica March 21, 2025 DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2016.211 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractSaul Kripke's unpublished views on functionalism in the philosophy of mind are presented, based on a transcript of a 1984 lecture. The lecture raises unresolved questions about the adequacy of functionalist accounts of mental states.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Finite automata Idealization Phenomenal character Teleology Turing machines |
| Key finding | Argues that Kripke's critique of functionalism, based on his 1984 lecture, raises unresolved questions for functionalist theories of mind. |
Abstract
Saul Kripke’s still largely unpublished views on functionalism in the philosophy of mind are expounded on the basis of a transcript of a 1984 lecture of his on the topic, and some unresolved questions identified.