How should we characterize the nature of conscious occurrent thought? In the last few years, a rather unexplored topic has appeared in philosophy of mind: cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenal character of cognitive mental episodes. In this paper I firstly present the motivation for cognitive phenomenology views through phenomenal contrast cases, taken as a challenge for their opponents....
El funcionalismo se ha convertido rápidamente en la concepción preponderante en la filosofía de la mente y en el nuevo campo de la ciencia cognoscitiva. El funcionalismo y, en general, la construcción de teorías en estas áreas, se enfrentan a dos obstáculos: las propiedades funcionales y las propiedades semánticas. Estas constituyen obstáculos porque no está claro como puede tener eficacia...
Saul Kripke’s still largely unpublished views on functionalism in the philosophy of mind are expounded on the basis of a transcript of a 1984 lecture of his on the topic, and some unresolved questions identified.