Philosophers debate whether conscious thoughts have a distinctive felt character—cognitive phenomenology—beyond sensory experiences like images or sounds. This paper defends cognitive phenomenology against two restrictivist objections. First, sensory restrictivism claims all conscious experience is sensory; the paper argues that attention cannot fully explain the difference between seeing and thinking. Second, accompanying states views hold that thoughts feel like something only because they are accompanied by sensory experiences. The paper draws on empirical studies by Hurlburt and colleagues that report “unsymbolized thinking”—clear thoughts without any sensory imagery—as evidence for a nonsensory phenomenal character. After addressing criticisms of these studies, the paper concludes that cognitive phenomenology views withstand both restrictivist challenges.
In this philosophical monograph, Georg Theiner defends the Extended Mind Thesis, the claim that mental processes can extend beyond the brain into the environment. Theiner argues that cognitive systems are not confined to the skull but can include external tools, artifacts, and social structures. He draws on empirical research in cognitive science and develops a theoretical framework to show how external resources can become constitutive parts of cognitive processes. The book engages with objections and alternative positions, ultimately arguing that the boundaries of the mind are not fixed by biology alone but are flexible and can include external elements.
El funcionalismo es la concepción dominante en filosofía de la mente y ciencia cognitiva, pero enfrenta dos obstáculos: las propiedades funcionales y las propiedades semánticas, cuya eficacia causal no está clara. Jerry Fodor denomina al primero "problema de Moliere" y al segundo "problema del solipsismo metodológico". Fodor sostiene que el problema semántico es más difícil y que el funcional ya está resuelto. Este artículo argumenta que Fodor se equivoca: ambos problemas tienen el mismo origen y la solución de uno llevaría a la del otro; además, el problema funcional no está resuelto. Se señala un posible camino hacia una solución conjunta.
Saul Kripke's unpublished views on functionalism in the philosophy of mind are presented, based on a transcript of a 1984 lecture. The lecture raises unresolved questions about the adequacy of functionalist accounts of mental states.