Self‐Representation and Perspectives in Dreams
Philosophy Compass November 1, 2013 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12082 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Dream Perspective graphical Representation politics Mental representation Self Cognition Epistemology Cognitive psychology Cognitive science Psychoanalysis |
| Citations | 32 |
| Key points | Argues that two forms of polymorphic self-representation in dreams—external observer perspective and vicarious dreams where another character occupies the first-person perspective—pose empirical and conceptual problems about the nature of self-representation. |
Abstract
Abstract Integrative and naturalistic philosophy of mind can both learn from and contribute to the contemporary cognitive sciences of dreaming. Two related phenomena concerning self‐representation in dreams demonstrate the need to bring disparate fields together. In most dreams, the protagonist or dream self who experiences and actively participates in dream events is or represents the dreamer: but in an intriguing minority of cases, self‐representation in dreams is displaced, disrupted, or even absent. Working from dream reports in established databanks, we examine two key forms of polymorphism of self‐representation: dreams (or dream episodes) in which I take an external visuospatial perspective on myself, and those in which I take someone else's perspective on events. In remembering my past experiences or imagining future or possible experiences when awake, I sometimes see myself from an external or ‘observer’ perspective. By relating the issue of perspective in dreams to established research traditions in the study of memory and imagery, and noting the flexibility of perspective in dreams, we identify new lines of enquiry. In other dreams, the dreamer does not appear to figure at all, and the first person perspective on dream events is occupied by someone else, some other person or character. We call these puzzling cases ‘vicarious dreams’ and assess some potential ways to make sense of them. Questions about self‐representation and perspectives in dreams are intriguing in their own right and pose empirical and conceptual problems about the nature of self‐representation with implications beyond the case of dreaming.
Citations in the library
Cited by 15
- What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams Frontiers in Psychology 2013
- How deep is the rift between conscious states in sleep and wakefulness? Spontaneous experience over the sleep–wake cycle Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences December 13, 2020
- Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind Philosophical Explorations May 4, 2018
- How to operationalise consciousness Australian Journal of Psychology November 15, 2019
- I’m thinking your thoughts while I sleep: Sense of agency and ownership over dream thought. Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice September 1, 2015
and 10 more in the library
Cites 15
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- Recall and recognition of dreams and waking events: A diary paradigm Leeds Beckett Repository 2011
and 10 more in the library