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Heuristics of Self-Consciousness between Theory of Mind and Intentionality

Cristina-Georgiana Voicu

American Journal of Applied Psychology 2015 DOI: 10.11648/j.ajap.20150403.11 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Intentionality Phenomenology philosophy Subjectivity Narrative Theory of mind Epistemology Self-consciousness Perspective graphical Cognitivism psychology Cognitive science Cognition Metaphysics
Key points Argues that self-awareness can be understood as a new form of intentional dynamics, emerging from the conjunction of phenomenology and cognitivism through the continuous updating of a divided self and the discovery of a hybrid self via intercommunication and the awareness of self through "us".

Abstract

This article starts from the interpretation of subjective experience and narrative hermeneutics, suggesting a cognitive re-evaluation of egotic intentionality from the “first-person perspective” and showing together the conjunction between phenomenology and cognitivism (the egotic self). The article also addresses the phenomenal consciousness according to D. Dennett’s theory of intentionality. In an attempt to highlight the reflected self as a form of consciousness, the work seeks the continuous updating of the divided self (hyphenated self) and the discovery of a new hybrid self by intercommunication and the awareness of self through “us”. Based on the theory of mind, the fluctuations of self and subjectivity aim at revealing the self existence. However, by the need to rethink the self position in relation to the hyper-reality of the mental metabolism, this article explores self-awareness as a new form of intentional dynamics / intentionality.

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