Ascribing Consciousness to Artificial Intelligence
arXiv Preprint Archive April 22, 2015 preprint
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cs.ai |
| Key points | Argues that both integrated information theory and functionalism can contribute to understanding consciousness, but that ascribing consciousness to human-level AI must await its development. |
Abstract
This paper critically assesses the anti-functionalist stance on consciousness adopted by certain advocates of integrated information theory (IIT), a corollary of which is that human-level artificial intelligence implemented on conventional computing hardware is necessarily not conscious. The critique draws on variations of a well-known gradual neuronal replacement thought experiment, as well as bringing out tensions in IIT's treatment of self-knowledge. The aim, though, is neither to reject IIT outright nor to champion functionalism in particular. Rather, it is suggested that both ideas have something to offer a scientific understanding of consciousness, as long as they are not dressed up as solutions to illusory metaphysical problems. As for human-level AI, we must await its development before we can decide whether or not to ascribe consciousness to it.