Skip to content

Applied phenomenology: why it is safe to ignore the epoché

D. Zahavi

Continental Philosophy Review April 9, 2019 DOI: 10.1007/s11007-019-09463-y (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that the epoché and reduction, while crucial for transcendental phenomenology, are of questionable relevance for non-philosophical applications of phenomenology in qualitative research.

Abstract

The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl’s writings on phenomenological psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl’s ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Citations in the library

Explore topics