Interpretation Theory and the First Person

The paper argues that the 'theory-theory' view—which treats ordinary psychological terms as part of a theory for explaining others' behavior—is a poor model for understanding how we ascribe mental states. It contends that the self/other asymmetries in how we apply psychological terms in first-person versus third-person contexts actually follow naturally from the core insights of the 'rationalizing interpretation' perspective associated with Davidson and Dennett. This reconciliation shows that the apparent conflict between rationalizing interpretation and simulation theory is less significant than commonly assumed.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The “rationalizing interpretation” view of psychological discourse, associated with Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, has been widely influential as a reconstruction of our practices of ascribing attitudes to others, and as an account of the meaning of psychological terms. This perspective has lent support to a wider assumption in philosophy of mind, that we should think of our ordinary use of psychological terms as part of a “theory” to explain the behavior of those around us. This paper argues that given the differences in application of psychological terms in their first-person and third-person uses, the “theory-theory” is a bad picture of what gives sense to our ascriptive practices. A proper understanding of the self/other asymmetries in psychological discourse shows that they follow quite naturally from the core truth of the “rationalizing” perspective, and that this shows the conflict between “rationalizing interpretation” and “simulation theory” to be less than it appears.