Pragmatism and Anscombe on the First Person
The Practical Turn October 12, 2017 DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197266168.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Anscombe's claims about the first person, including that 'I' does not refer, arise from pragmatist questions about the use and importance of the word 'I'. Proposes that her notion of 'self-consciousness'—speaking for ourselves without verification—clarifies these claims, making them more sympathetic even if not fully endorsed. |
Abstract
Anscombe’s famous paper on the first person makes claims which may seem bewildering or absurd, that we have ‘unmediated conceptions’ of some of our states and actions, that these conceptions are ‘subjectless’, and also, very controversially, that ‘I’ does not refer. Anscombe would not have identified herself as a pragmatist. But we can gain insight into and sympathy with some of these claims (even if we do not end up fully endorsing all of them) by seeing that they arise from her asking central pragmatist questions about ‘I’, that is how we use the word and why using it that way is important for us. Her answer centres on what she calls ‘self-consciousness’, that is, our ability to speak for ourselves, to say how things are with us, or what we are doing without checking to make sure that it is really ourselves we are speaking about.