EMPATHY AND THE EXTENDED MIND

Empathy and interpersonal understanding are fundamentally extended bodily activities rather than purely internal mental processes. The two dominant models—theory theory and simulation theory—both assume understanding happens inside the head. Drawing on the extended mind thesis, this analysis argues that much social understanding occurs outside the head, supported by narratives of individuals with Moebius syndrome, a condition involving bilateral facial paralysis that impairs expressive ability. A Zen Buddhist ethics of responsiveness helps articulate the practical significance of this body-based account of empathy.

Study at a glance

Abstract

I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis (EM) to analyze empathy and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that empathy is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and empathy. Next, I challenge their internalist orthodoxy and offer an alternative “extended” characterization of empathy. In support of this characterization, I analyze some narratives of individuals with Moebius syndrome, a kind of expressive deficit resulting from bilateral facial paralysis. I conclude by discussing how a Zen Buddhist ethics of responsiveness is helpful for articulating the practical significance of an extended, body‐based account of empathy.