Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology
Phenomenology and Mind November 26, 2016 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-19557 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe extended mind thesis holds that cognitive processes can extend beyond the brain into tools and the environment. This essay argues that the body itself plays a nontrivial role in such extended cognition, particularly through the acquisition of habits. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's concept of the body schema and Clark and Chalmers' extended mind hypothesis, the author contends that incorporating new habits into one's body schema meaningfully improves behavioral competence, systemic performance, and the endorsement and invocation of external components. Habitualization of the body to its environment is not always central or necessary, but it can make a meaningful difference in how well a coupled cognitive system functions, highlighting that enhanced cognitive performance relies on the body and its organs together with mind and thing.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that incorporating new habits into one's body schema meaningfully improves the functioning of extended cognitive systems, and that the body's role should be taken into account alongside mind and external tools. |
Abstract
This short essay attempts to flesh out the extended mind thesis by showing the nontrivial role of the body in skilled epistemic action. This is attempted by bringing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body schema together with Clark and Chalmers account of the extended mind. What the author hopes to show is that the incorporation of new habits into one’s body schema can make a meaningful difference for extended cognition as it regards behavioral competence, systemic performance, endorsement of external components, and typical invocation of external components. Habitualization of one’s body to environment and things in the environment is perhaps not a central part of the cognitive system - nor is it always necessary - but habit can and does make a meaningful difference in how well a coupled cognitive system might function and therefore ought to be taken into account. Moreover, habit highlights the extent to which enhanced cognitive performance relies on the body and its organs in conjunction with mind and thing. The essay proceeds by introducing Clark and Chalmers’ version of the extended mind hypothesis from before turning to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the acquisition of habit qua modifications of the body-schema in conjunction with the extended mind.