The Phenomenology of Habits: Integrating First-Person and Neuropsychological Studies of Memory

This article argues that cognitive experimental memory research often neglects the first-person experiential basis of its procedures, risking misrepresentation of phenomena like habits. Drawing on embodied cognition and phenomenology, the author contends that procedural memory-based skills and habits are not necessarily confined to unconscious, sub-personal mechanisms; some cognitive processes involve the pre-reflectively experienced lived-body, giving us experiential access to bodily processes not yet conceptualized. The author proposes integrating such experiences into neuropsychological research on habits using the method of 'front-loaded phenomenology.'

Study at a glance

Abstract

There is an ongoing debate how one can integrate the subjective (first-person) dimension of experiences more thoroughly into neuropsychological research. In cognitive experimental memory research, for instance, cognitive psychology begins by separating the act of recollection from the context where recollections occur, so as to make memory research suitable for study in the experimental conditions of the laboratory. It is the claim of this article that the challenge for memory research consists not merely in the (possible) loss of meaning entailed by transforming embedded recollected experiences into operationalized cognitive functions. Rather, from the outset, the first-person experiential basis of the entire research procedure is often insufficiently elaborated and hence risks neglecting or misrepresenting significant dimensions of the phenomena it studies. I demonstrate this with regard to habits understood as procedural memories. Research based on the paradigm of embodied cognition and phenomenology has shown that procedural memory-based skills and habits are not necessarily confined to sub-personal (unconscious) processing mechanisms. This paradigm states that some cognitive processes involve not only the brain but also the pre-reflectively experienced lived-body. The key idea is that we have experiential access to bodily processes that are not yet conceptualized or reflexively mediated. In the final part of my paper, I delineate how such experiences can be integrated into the neuropsychological study of habits via the method of ‘front-loaded phenomenology.’