The necessity for the observer to examine the system from a first-person frame of reference to trace the path of generation of inner sensations
F1000Research January 25, 2017 preprint DOI: 10.12688/f1000research.6720.2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that because third-person observers cannot access first-person inner sensations, studies of higher brain functions substitute behavioral manifestations for those sensations. Proposes that understanding how internal sensations form requires the system to make a first-person search to induce sensory qualia, with observers examining from a first-person frame of reference. |
Abstract
Anyone seeking to study the first-person properties of higher brain functions faces significant difficulties. Since a third-person observer cannot access the first-person-inner sensations in a subject, the current studies are using behavioral manifestations in lieu of inner sensations of higher brain functions. It is required to cross a barrier for understanding the mechanism of formation of internal sensations. The present work explains why the system should be making a first-person search to induce sensory qualia for the internal sensations and the observer who traces along the same path must make an examination from a first-person frame of reference.
Citations in the library
Cites 4
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