Consciousness and Complexity: Neurobiological Naturalism and Integrated Information Theory

This paper compares two conceptual frameworks for explaining phenomenal experience: Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT). The authors first introduce both frameworks, then outline their analytical approach. They articulate philosophical profiles of NN and IIT, addressing each theory's ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, they compare the two frameworks point-by-point, including their respective positions on artificial consciousness. The analysis suggests that despite some similarities noted by proponents of NN, the two theories differ in significant ways.

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Abstract

In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and aim to compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt’s Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi’s and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.