IIT is ideally positioned to explain perceptual phenomena.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x21001965 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe author argues that a critique of integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness is mistaken, particularly regarding IIT's relationship to rigorous phenomenology and to the psychophysics of perception.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that the critique of integrated information theory's connection to phenomenology and psychophysics is unfounded. |
Abstract
The target article's critique of the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness is misguided on several fronts, which I hope are addressed in other comments, but here I focus on the connection (or supposed lack thereof) between IIT and rigorous phenomenology, and IIT's connection to the psychophysics of perception.