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“Difficult problem” of analytical philosophy

D V Mamchenkov

Rudn Journal of Philosophy September 16, 2018 DOI: 10.22363/2313-2302-2017-21-2-222-228 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The paper examines the 'hard problem' of consciousness through the lens of onto-epistemological uncertainty. It argues that the way analytic philosophy frames the problem inevitably makes it a pseudo-problem. By consistently applying the principle of onto-epistemological uncertainty, the apparent antinomy in questions about consciousness is resolved, opening a productive path for explaining consciousness in both natural sciences and philosophy.

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Трудная проблема сознания Сознание и мозг Субъективная реальность Онто-гносеологическая неопределенность
Key finding Argues that the "hard problem" of consciousness is a pseudo-problem and that onto-epistemological uncertainty resolves the antinomy between subjective and objective explanations.

Abstract

The paper analyzes “Hard problem” of consciousness through the principle of the onto-epistemological uncertainty. It is shown that the method of production of “Hard problem” in the analytic philosophical tradition inevitably makes it a pseudo. At the same time, with the consistent implementation of the principle of the onto-epistemological uncertainty is removed antinomy solutions to the questions of the consciousness and opens the way for a productive problem-solving in the explanation of consciousness as in the natural sciences and philosophy.

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