Kant and Cognitive Science
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 2019 DOI: 10.4324/9781315789354-12 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that three of Kant's ideas—unified consciousness as essential to cognition, unity from concept-using synthesis, and unusual features of self-knowledge—have been largely overlooked in cognitive science. |
Abstract
In this paper I argue that while the dominant model of the mind in cognitive science is deeply Kantian, some of Kant’s most arresting ideas have not been assimilated into the contemporary picture. The Kantian elements in the contemporary picture are mainly these three: Representation requires both percepts and concepts, the study of cognition is based on inference to the best explanation (Kant called it transcendental argument), and the mind is a complex system of functions – minds are (part of ) what brains do. Three other important ideas of Kant’s have played little role: That unified consciousness is essential to our kind of cognition (beginning to change), that such unity is the result of concept-using synthesizing activities of the cognitive system, and that the knowledge that such a system has of itself has some highly specific and unusual features.