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Kant and Cognitive Science

A. Brook

Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society January 1, 2019 DOI: 10.4324/9781315789354-12 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Kant's philosophy of mind has deeply shaped cognitive science, particularly through the ideas that representation requires both sensory input and concepts, that the mind is studied through inference to the best explanation, and that mental activity is a function of the brain. However, three of Kant's most distinctive ideas remain largely absent from contemporary cognitive science: unified consciousness is essential to cognition, this unity arises from concept-driven synthesis, and the mind's self-knowledge has unique and peculiar characteristics. The paper argues that these neglected Kantian insights could enrich current understanding of the mind.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Psychology Philosophy
Key finding Argues that three of Kant's ideas—unified consciousness as essential to cognition, unity from concept-using synthesis, and unusual features of self-knowledge—have been largely overlooked in cognitive science.

Abstract

In this paper I argue that while the dominant model of the mind in cognitive science is deeply Kantian, some of Kant’s most arresting ideas have not been assimilated into the contemporary picture. The Kantian elements in the contemporary picture are mainly these three: Representation requires both percepts and concepts, the study of cognition is based on inference to the best explanation (Kant called it transcendental argument), and the mind is a complex system of functions – minds are (part of ) what brains do. Three other important ideas of Kant’s have played little role: That unified consciousness is essential to our kind of cognition (beginning to change), that such unity is the result of concept-using synthesizing activities of the cognitive system, and that the knowledge that such a system has of itself has some highly specific and unusual features.

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