The Positional Self: Consciousness as a Condition of Self-Involving Anticipation
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) July 5, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21209710 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Anticipation artificial intelligence Consciousness Argument complex analysis Subject documents Class philosophy Orientation vector space Cognitive psychology Cognitive science Chronesthesia Mental model Task project management |
| Key points | Proposes that the positional self is a functional structure required for self-involving, action-guiding anticipation in future-directed simulations. |
Abstract
This working paper proposes the concept of the positional self as a functional structure required for self-involving, action-guiding anticipation. It argues that some forms of future-directed simulation require more than predictive modelling: they require a first-person anchor from which a future scenario can be inhabited as mine. The paper connects this argument to mental time travel, autonoetic consciousness, first-person contents, de se attitudes, predictive processing, exaptation, and the author's Orientation Theory. It remains deliberately limited: it does not claim to solve the hard problem of consciousness and does not argue that all anticipation is conscious. Its claim concerns the narrower class of anticipatory simulations in which the acting subject must be represented as the future bearer of action. Version 0.2 is a revised concept note.