Simulation, Self, and the Phenomenal Field: An Evolutionary Hypothesis on Consciousness

Abstract

Consciousness remains one of the most persistent problems in philosophy and cognitive science. Despite substantial advances in neuroscience, no consensus exists regarding how physical processes give rise to subjective experience. This paper proposes an evolutionary hypothesis according to which consciousness emerges from the interaction of three fundamental dimensions: neural integration of sensory information, the continuous influence of internal bodily states, and the capacity to simulate and anticipate possible scenarios. Within this framework, conscious experience is interpreted not as a mere byproduct of neural processing but as the phenomenological manifestation of a biological system capable of integrating multiple streams of information to construct a model of the organism situated in its environment. The paper develops the thesis that human consciousness can be understood as the result of an evolutionary simulation system that integrates external perception and internal bodily states within a phenomenal field structured around a bodily located self. Once established, this system may have exceeded its original adaptive functions, supporting complex forms of self-reflection, symbolic language, and cumulative culture. The proposal is also intended as an analysis of how contemporary cognitive science constructs explanatory models of consciousness, connecting neural mechanisms, embodied processes, and evolutionary function.