Phenomenal structure: What is it and what is it for?

Abstract

Core theoretical and methodological commitments for a structuralist science of phenomenal experience are articulated in sufficient detail to define a substantive, actionable research program. I argue that phenomenal experience is characterized by geometric, group-theoretic, and dynamic structure. Intuitively, these structures correspond to phenomenal quality spaces, perceptual constancies, and the perceived valence or affordance of possibilities for action. These structures instantiate distinctively phenomenal features of experience: geometrical structure functions as a precondition for meaning; group-theoretic structure induces a distinction between subject and object; and dynamical structure imbues the objective world with value and meaning. The methodological imperative of a structuralist science of consciousness is to establish isomorphisms, or structure-preserving maps, between these phenomenal structures and corresponding neural and physical structures. Progress in this research program is driven by iterative refinement and de-idealization of phenomenal, neural, and physical models in the pursuit of more sophisticated and precise isomorphisms between them. This project succeeds in targeting first-personal phenomenal experience by rendering structural relations between phenomenal experiences behaviorally manifest, and thereby exposing them to intersubjective comparisons using third-personal methods.