Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9148-0 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 40 |
| Key points | Argues that the sense of ownership and sense of agency are not separable but intimately related and modulate each other, proposing a gradual reading that allows for various blends of the two. |
Abstract
We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual reading of the two that allows for various blends of SO and SA. Such an approach not only provides us with a richer phenomenology but also with a more parsimonious view of the minimal self.