Personal Intentionalism and the Understanding of Emotion Experience
Sarah Arnaud, Kathryn Pendoley
Journal of Consciousness Studies August 1, 2023 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.7.061 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that strong intentionalism about emotion has rarely been defended and has failed to be explanatory where it has been, and proposes "personal intentionalism," on which the qualitative features of emotion are fully determined by intentional content that varies inter- and intraindividually according to one's cares, concerns, and other mental states. |
Abstract
How should we seek to account for the qualitative aspect of emotion? Strong intentionalism presents one promising avenue for such an account. According to strong intentionalism, the phenomenology of a mental state is entirely determined by that state's intentional content. Given that many views of the emotions have it that the intentionality and phenomenology of the emotions are very closely related, this makes strong intentionalism an especially promising route. However, strong intentionalism has rarely been defended for emotions and, we argue, where it has, it has failed to be explanatory. This paper proposes a new explanatory form of strong intentionalism about emotion. We call it personal intentionalism. According to this view, the qualitative features of emotion are fully determined by the emotion's intentional content. This content varies inter- and intraindividually, according to one's cares and concerns, as well as one's other mental states. We assess its compatibility with theories of consciousness.