Mental Construction: A Shared Framework in Psychology and Husserl-Inspired Model of Intentionality

Abstract

Constructionists claim that emotions result from the categorization of a kind of phenomenal character, or what is known as core affect. This categorization takes shape in terms of prior situated experience. Husserl, in turn, suggests that perceptions emerge from the apprehension of a kind of phenomenal character. Similarly, this also takes shape in terms of prior situated experience. Thus, the constructionism of emotion and Husserl’s Apprehension Model can be seen as two independent formulations of one and the same framework. They both provide the Construction Framework of the Mental (CFM). This framework takes most folk psychological categories to be “constructs” built from more basic mental processes. Given the consistency of the constructionist framework of mental states with recent findings in neuroscience and competitive metaphysical positions, along with its application in psychology and phenomenology, this framework for the formation of mental states should be considered a feasible research framework.