Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness
Journal of Consciousness Studies March 31, 2022 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.3.180 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 43 |
| Key points | Argues that given materialism, phenomenal consciousness is likely not particularly normatively significant, and animal ethics should move toward an ethics without sentience. |
Abstract
Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethics without sentience.