Does the Concept of “Altered States of Consciousness” Rest on a Mistake?
Adam J. Rock, Stanley Krippner
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 2007 DOI: 10.24972/ijts.2007.26.1.33 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Altered states of consciousness |
| Keywords | Fallacy Mistake Epistemology Content measure theory Confusion Social consciousness Psychoanalysis Law |
| Citations | 37 |
| Key points | Argues that the term "altered state of consciousness" mistakenly conflates consciousness with its content, and proposes replacing it with "altered pattern of phenomenal properties." |
Abstract
Block (2002) has argued that the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to consciousness is due\nto the erroneous treatment of very different concepts as a single concept. Block distinguished\nfour notions of consciousness intended to encapsulate the various meanings attributed to\nthe term: phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness. We argue that what is\ncommon to all of these definitions is the implicit distinction between consciousness and the\ncontent of consciousness. We critically examine the term “altered state of consciousness”\nand argue that affixing the qualifier “altered state” to consciousness results in a theoretical\nconfusion of consciousness and its content, that is, consciousness is mistaken for the content\nof consciousness. We refer to this as the consciousness/content fallacy and argue that\nit may be avoided if one supplants “altered states of consciousness” with “altered pattern of\nphenomenal properties,” an extrapolation of the term “phenomenal field.” Implications of\nthe consciousness/content fallacy for theory and research are also considered.