We've only just begun
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038358 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 12 |
| Key points | Argues that Block is right that consciousness is a "mongrel concept" and that conflating its different senses misleads researchers, but contends Block's own notion of "P-consciousness" itself merges two, or arguably three, separate and separable features of a sensory state. |
Abstract
Abstract Block contends that the concept of consciousness is a mongrel concept and that researchers go astray by conflating different notions of “consciousness.” This is certainly true. In fact, it is truer than Block acknowledges, because his own notion of P-consciousness runs together two, or arguably three, quite different and separable features of a sensory state.