Buddhist Philosophy of Mind: Nāgārjuna's Critique of Mind-Body Dualism from His Rebirth Arguments
Philosophy East and West 2019 DOI: 10.1353/pew.2019.0064 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Dualism Argument complex analysis Mind–body problem Epistemology Theology |
| Key points | Argues that Nāgārjuna completely rejects Dharmakīrti's mind-body dualism and the rebirth theory built upon it. |
Abstract
Richard Hayes (1993, 2013) and Dan Arnold (2008, 2012) have argued that Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660 C.E.) is a mind-body dualist. The proof, they say, lies in the justification he gives for his theory of rebirth. In this paper, I put Dharmakīrti’s argument to the test against a rival argument of Nāgārjuna. It turns out Nāgārjuna completely rejects the mind-body dualism of Dharmakīrti and the rebirth theory built upon it.