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The Perceptual Sense of Agency

Gabriel Siegel

Review of Philosophy and Psychology November 11, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-025-00788-7 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Perception Agency philosophy Sense of agency Philosophy of science Mode computer interface Common sense Cognitive psychology Epistemology Sensory system Process computing Mechanism biology
Key points Argues that the perceptual sense of agency is best understood as an intentional mode rather than as specific contents represented in perceptual experience.

Abstract

Abstract The sense of agency is the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions. In this paper, I provide a novel account of the sense of agency that appears in perceptual consciousness. I follow theorists such as Bayne and Prinz in suggesting that the perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes. The self-monitoring mechanism compares sensory predictions, made on the basis of motor commands, with sensory feedback. This comparison process distinguishes self-caused from other-caused perceptual changes. I argue for a view where the PSoA is not explained by certain contents represented in perceptual experience. Rather, my account models the PSoA as a type of intentional mode that perceivers bear to contents. After defending this view, I respond to objections and contrast my account with others in the literature.

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