Self-Reference, Feedback, and the Explanatory Gap: The Epistemological Irreducibility of Consciousness
Junly Ma, Ruijia Ma
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 9, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21277468 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Irreducibility Consciousness Subjectivity Physicalism Cognition Boundary topology Epistemology Qualia Explanatory power |
| Key points | Argues that the explanatory gap between third-person informational descriptions and first-person subjective presence is an unbridgeable cognitive limitation rooted in the self-referential structure of conscious systems. |
Abstract
This paper argues that the subjective aspect of consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) cannot be exhaustively explained by any functional model based on information feedback. This predicament does not stem from a temporary lack of empirical data, but is rooted in the self-referential structure of conscious systems: any attempt to explain the system's own subjectivity using its internal processes inevitably falls into an epistemological closure. By formally defining an "information-feedback-storage" model and introducing Gödel's incompleteness theorems as a philosophical analogy, this paper points out that the explanatory gap is essentially a self-referential dilemma—for a system to fully explain itself, it must stand outside itself, which is logically impossible. This paper does not claim to prove substance dualism, but merely reveals an unbridgeable cognitive gap between third-person informational descriptions and first-person subjective presence; this gap is a limitation of descriptive frameworks, not evidence that mind is detached from physical substrates. The conclusion is that the irreducibility of consciousness is not a theoretical failure, but a necessary boundary condition of self-referential systems.