Consciousness, AI, and the Limits of Scientific Explanation
arXiv Preprint Archive May 29, 2026 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractScience, by its nature, relies on third-person, reproducible observations, which makes it powerless to address first-person, subjective phenomena like consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness—explaining why there is something it is like to see red or feel pain—is not a scientific problem awaiting better tools but a category error. The same limitation applies to machine consciousness: neither its presence nor absence can be scientifically settled. Aspects of cognition such as deliberative thinking and understanding also have an irreducibly experiential dimension beyond science. While a unified framework for objective and subjective may be unattainable, practical questions about consciousness in machines and nonhuman animals can still be navigated.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Q-bio.nc |
| Key finding | Argues that the hard problem of consciousness is a category error, not a scientific problem, and that first-personal phenomena are beyond the reach of third-person scientific explanation. |
Abstract
Science is constitutively third-personal: its findings are in principle reproducible by any observer, independent of perspective, and answerable to measurement. This is the source of its power and also its limit when it comes to phenomena that are first-personal. While it is obvious that a science of the Meaning of Life is unattainable, researchers have not drawn the same conclusion for consciousness -- in its phenomenal dimension, the qualia of seeing red, of feeling pain, of being anything at all. I argue they should. The hard problem of consciousness is not a scientific problem awaiting better tools or a more ambitious theory, but a category error. The same structural problem applies to machine consciousness: neither attribution nor denial is scientifically adjudicable. Beyond subjective consciousness, aspects of cognition, such as deliberative thinking and understanding, also have an irreducibly first-personal, experiential dimension that places them outside the reach of third-person scientific explanation. I situate science within a broader ecology of understanding and argue that, while a unified framework addressing both the objective and the subjective may be unattainable, practical questions about consciousness, including in machines and nonhuman animals, can nonetheless be navigated.