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Cognitive Naturalism and the Phenomenal Feel

Gregor Michael Hoerzer

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia December 28, 2015 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2015.0048 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Eliminative materialism Phenomenal consciousness Explanatory gap Cognitive naturalism
Key points Argues that Nannini's cognitive naturalism cannot account for the phenomenal feel of conscious states and that the analogy between conceptual change in time and consciousness is flawed.

Abstract

According to Sandro Nannini’s Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Naturalism, we can draw an analogy between the shift in the conception of time that occurred in physics with the introduction of relativity theory and a shift towards a scientifically more graspable functional concept of phenomenal consciousness. This analogy is meant to persuade us of the eliminative materialist view that we should abandon our folk psychological concept of consciousness. In my commentary, I examine the naturalization procedure underlying Nannini’s cognitive naturalism, argue for its inability to account for the phenomenal feel of conscious states, and point to some important differences between the conceptual change in the case of time and the intended change in the case of consciousness.

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