Felt Time: The Phenomenological Present as the Ground of Temporal Experience
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) January 7, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18176011 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Temporality Consciousness Neurophenomenology Phenomenology philosophy Time perception Arrow of time Dynamics music Cognitive psychology Interpretative phenomenological analysis Test biology Epistemology Lived experience Cognitive science |
| Key points | Argues that 'Felt Time'—the intrinsic phenomenological present—is not a perception of time but the ground condition from which temporal concepts are projected, and proposes it as a candidate phenomenosignature for consciousness. |
Abstract
Contemporary physics increasingly suggests that time may not be fundamental, while neuroscience treats subjective temporality as constructed and elastic. Yet conscious experience is invariably characterized by a vivid sense of presence—a felt "now"—that persists across all states. This paper introduces Felt Time: the intrinsic phenomenological present that underlies all experience but is not reducible to clocks, sequences, or representations. I argue that Felt Time is not a perception of time, but the ground condition from which temporal concepts are projected. This reversal of the explanatory arrow reframes debates in phenomenology, neuroscience, and physics, and provides a candidate phenomenosignature for consciousness itself. A neurophenomenological protocol is proposed to test Felt Time's invariance across conditions where clock-time perception varies. Keywords: phenomenology, time consciousness, phenomenosignatures, temporal experience, neurophenomenology