A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness.
Frontiers in Psychology 2021 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.704270 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Qualia Relativity physics |
| Citations | 27 |
| Key points | Proposes that phenomenal consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, observable from a first-person cognitive frame of reference but not from a third-person one, and that neither perspective is privileged. |
Abstract
In recent decades, the scientific study of consciousness has significantly increased our understanding of this elusive phenomenon. Yet, despite critical development in our understanding of the functional side of consciousness, we still lack a fundamental theory regarding its phenomenal aspect. There is an "explanatory gap" between our scientific knowledge of functional consciousness and its "subjective," phenomenal aspects, referred to as the "hard problem" of consciousness. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is the first-person answer to "what it's like" question, and it has thus far proved recalcitrant to direct scientific investigation. Naturalistic dualists argue that it is composed of a primitive, private, non-reductive element of reality that is independent from the functional and physical aspects of consciousness. Illusionists, on the other hand, argue that it is merely a cognitive illusion, and that all that exists are ultimately physical, non-phenomenal properties. We contend that both the dualist and illusionist positions are flawed because they tacitly assume consciousness to be an absolute property that doesn't depend on the observer. We develop a conceptual and a mathematical argument for a relativistic theory of consciousness in which a system either has or doesn't have phenomenal consciousness with respect to some observer. Phenomenal consciousness is neither private nor delusional, just relativistic. In the frame of reference of the cognitive system, it will be observable (first-person perspective) and in other frame of reference it will not (third-person perspective). These two cognitive frames of reference are both correct, just as in the case of an observer that claims to be at rest while another will claim that the observer has constant velocity. Given that consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, neither observer position can be privileged, as they both describe the same underlying reality. Based on relativistic phenomena in physics we developed a mathematical formalization for consciousness which bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem. Given that the first-person cognitive frame of reference also offers legitimate observations on consciousness, we conclude by arguing that philosophers can usefully contribute to the science of consciousness by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures.
Comparable studies
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| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 8
- A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications. Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology August 1, 2024
- Active inference, computational phenomenology, and advanced meditation: Toward the formalization of the experience of meditation. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews March 1, 2026
- The conception of consciousness from Metaphysics to Quantum Biology: Critical review World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews September 27, 2022
- Neuropil magic and the experiential aspect of consciousness (v7) July 12, 2023
- Assessment of Physical Processes for Describing Mechanism of Occurrence and Measurement of Consciousness Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness October 27, 2024
and 3 more in the library
Cites 13
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto Biological Bulletin December 1, 2008
- The Hidden Spring, a Journey to the Source of Consciousness Psychoanalysis October 20, 2022
- Consciousness and the Laws of Physics Journal of Consciousness Studies 2021
- Toward a standard model of consciousness: Reconciling the attention schema, global workspace, higher-order thought, and illusionist theories Cognitive Neuropsychology May 18, 2020
and 8 more in the library