How voluntary control over information and body movements determines "what it's like" to have perceptual, bodily, emotional and mental experiences.
J Kevin O'Regan
Frontiers in Psychology 2022 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1108279 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Body movements Locus of attribution Perceptual presence Phenomenal consciousness Sensorimotor theory Voluntary control What it’s like |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that the locus and imposingness of phenomenal experiences are determined by the interplay between voluntary bodily actions and sensorimotor feedback, offering a framework for a scientific theory of phenomenal consciousness. |
Abstract
Two very fundamental aspects of phenomenal experiences underline the fact that they seem to have "something it's like." One aspect is the fact that experiences have a locus: they Can seem "external" (perceptual), "internal" (interoceptive, bodily or emotional) or "mental." A second fundamental aspect is the imposingness of experiences. They can seem "present" to us in different ways, sometimes seeming displayed before us with "spatio-temporal presence." Both these aspects of "what it's like" can be identified with the degree to which we can voluntarily control what we are doing when we engage in an experience. The external/internal/mental dimension is determined by how our voluntary bodily actions can influence the sensorimotor flow of information. The degree of imposingness of experiences and their "spatio-temporal presence" Is determined by how our voluntary actions are impeded or assisted by innate, attention-grabbing mechanisms. By elucidating these two most fundamental aspects of "what it's like," and taken together with prior work on inter- and intra-modal differences in experiences, this article suggests a path toward a scientific theory of the "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness, explaining why experiences feel like something rather than feeling like nothing.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 5
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Sensorimotor and Enactive Approaches to Consciousness March 15, 2018
- Explaining what people say about sensory qualia Oxford University Press eBooks August 19, 2010
- Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness Cognitive Neuroscience July 14, 2020
- Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1999