Explaining what people say about sensory qualia
Oxford University Press eBooks August 19, 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 10 |
| Key points | Argues that the sensorimotor account explains the ineffability, structure, and qualitative character of sensory experience by grounding the 'feel' of sensation in the laws of sensorimotor interaction, rather than in brain mechanisms alone. |
Abstract
This chapter discusses three problematic aspects of sensory experiences: their ineffability, structure, and ‘what it's like’ to undergo the experiences. It argues that these features of sensory experiences seem to admit of no explanation in terms of brain mechanisms. However, the sensorimotor account of phenomenal consciousness provides a satisfactory account of these puzzling features of sensory experience by proposing that the experienced ‘feel’ of a sensation derives from the laws of dependency that govern an observer's current active engagement with the environment. The sensorimotor approach emphasizes the distinction between two steps involved in an account of conscious experience: firstly characterizing the quality of sensory feels as enabled by the quality of the sensorimotor interaction involved; and secondly determining the requirements for an agent to be conscious of this quality.