The feeling of being alive: phenomenology and biology
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences April 6, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-026-10145-3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Depression Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Lived body Self-awareness Consciousness Vitality Conation Autopoiesis Homeostasis Cotard syndrome |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that self-awareness is grounded in the life process of the whole organism, not in neural correlates of consciousness alone. |
Abstract
The feeling of being alive points to an intricate connection between the organic process of life and foundational subjective experience, or between life and experience ( Leben and Erleben ). Based on this premise, I argue that self-experience cannot be understood as an internal mental space or a “self-model” that could be produced and localized in the brain, but rather that it is a manifestation of the life of the organism as a whole. I first examine in detail the phenomenology of the feeling of life, distinguishing between two components: vitality (basic vital feelings) and conation (drive, urge, desire). Furthermore, I demonstrate the foundations of both components in self-regulating processes that maintain the homeostasis of the entire organism. The sufficient basis of self-awareness cannot then be found in individual “neural correlates of consciousness,” but only in the self-organization and life process of the organism in its relationship to the environment. The feeling of being alive is then shown to be the fundamental form of self-awareness, both from a phenomenological and a biological point of view. Finally, the paper explores the psychopathology of the feeling of being alive, taking the examples of depression and Cotard syndrome.