The "minimal self" in psychopathology: re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum
Jean Naudin, Michel René Joseph Cermolacce, Josef Parnas
September 1, 2007 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.013 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 2 |
| Population | Patients with schizophrenia |
| Key points | Argues that analyzing schizophrenic experience can clarify the experiential features of the minimal self, such as first-person perspective, mineness, transparency, embodiment, and the distinction between agency and ownership. |
Abstract
The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the 'mineness' of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, considered as different and less fundamental than the feeling of mineness. Two clinical vignettes of patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia will be presented: the first one, illustrating early illness stages, and the second case, of chronic schizophrenia, symptomatically marked by persistent hallucinations. Through their analysis, we will discuss the experiential dimensions of minimal self