A plank across the explanatory gap: The case of pain.
Consciousness and Cognition July 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2025.103871 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Explanatory gap Functional description Mechanistic explanation Phenomenal consciousness Reductive explanation Pain perception Cognitive science |
| Key points | Argues that the explanatory gap between phenomenal experience and neural mechanisms can be closed by framing affective pain as a cognitive function—feeling an urge to avoid—supported by empirical evidence. |
Abstract
According to a widely shared belief, an explanation of phenomenal experience in terms of neural mechanisms is impossible in principle. The reason for this "Explanatory Gap" is supposed to be a basic incompatibility between phenomenal and neuroscientific knowledge: while the latter is framed in terms of functional relationships, it is impossible to capture phenomenal experience in functional terms. Here, we will take three steps to avert this conclusion and show what an explanation of the qualitative character of phenomenal experience might look like. In Step I, we show that two pivotal assumptions underlying the "Explanatory Gap" argument are unfounded. This means that the problem of phenomenal experience can be solved with the familiar methods of hypothesis development and testing. In Step II, we hypothesize that paradigmatic sorts of phenomenal experience like affective pain can be captured in functional terms, provided the function is framed in cognitive rather than behavioral terms: feeling affective pain is feeling an urge to avoid. In Step III, we will present empirical evidence corroborating this claim. We will also indicate how this functional description can help to identify the neural mechanisms underlying affective pain experience. We take this as a proof of principle showing that the qualitative character of phenomenal experience can be explained in objective neuroscientific terms. We will conclude with some remarks on how our approach might contribute to future progress in our understanding of consciousness in general.
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Citations in the library
Cites 5
- Are There Levels of Consciousness? Trends in Cognitive Sciences April 22, 2016
- The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective. Frontiers in Psychology 2024
- First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument. Consciousness and Cognition February 1, 2022
- Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate. Nature Reviews Neuroscience July 2016
- On the origin of consciousness, a postulate and its corollary. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 1996