Consciousness in Neorealism: Perry, Montague, and Holt.

The philosophical positions of early twentieth-century American neo-realists on consciousness are reconstructed and critiqued. Drawing on the works of Ralph Barton Perry, William Pepperrell Montague, and Edwin B. Holt, the analysis shows that Montague and Holt each grappled with the problem of error—how false beliefs can exist if all mental content is directly real—and offered opposing solutions. Their disagreement is highlighted as a central tension in the movement. The discussion is then connected to present-day debates in the philosophy of mind, suggesting that these historical disputes remain relevant.

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Abstract

The early twentieth-century American neo-realists' approach to consciousness is historically reconstructed and critically discussed. With reference to the relevant works of Ralph Barton Perry, William Pepperrell Montague, and Edwin B. Holt, it is argued that Montague and Holt, in particular, struggled with the problem of error and disagreed strongly on their solutions to it. Finally, a line is drawn to related discussions in contemporary philosophy of mind.