Bridging the Gap? Naïve Realism and the Problem of Consciousness
Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception June 10, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the naïve realist's distinctive solution to the Problem of Consciousness requires rejecting physicalism, a commitment many regard as a fixed point in theorizing about perception. Proposes that naïve realism may be best understood as a transcendental theory of perception. |
Abstract
Abstract: How should we decide between philosophical theories of perception? This paper addresses this question by considering the debate between naïve realists and their opponents, and in particular the claim that naïve realism provides a distinctive way of resolving the Problem of Consciousness. I argue that the naïve realist’s solution requires rejecting what many consider to be a ‘fixed point’ in theorizing about perception: a commitment to physicalism. In light of this, I consider different ways of understanding naïve realism and its motivation, suggesting that naïve realism might be best understood as a transcendental theory of perception.