Henri Bergson's wartime speeches of 1914 drew on his philosophy of creative evolution to contrast France and Germany: France, as a nation of creative life, could renew itself, while Germany, despite its technological strength, was a mechanistic power destined to exhaust itself. This paper argues that Bergson's mobilization of his philosophy relied on his concept of will—life as a creative principle is will, and he opposed to Germany a controllable, commandable willpower. Understanding this is essential for interpreting Bergson's later thoughts on technology, modernity, and mysticism.
The philosophical positions of early twentieth-century American neo-realists on consciousness are reconstructed and critiqued. Drawing on the works of Ralph Barton Perry, William Pepperrell Montague, and Edwin B. Holt, the analysis shows that Montague and Holt each grappled with the problem of error—how false beliefs can exist if all mental content is directly real—and offered opposing solutions. Their disagreement is highlighted as a central tension in the movement. The discussion is then connected to present-day debates in the philosophy of mind, suggesting that these historical disputes remain relevant.