Affective Experience and Evidence for Animal Consciousness
Philosophical Topics 2020 DOI: 10.5840/philtopics20204816 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that research by Dickinson and Balleine provides particularly good evidence of conscious affective experience in rats, based on a sophisticated goal-directed action selection system and a contrast between apparently conscious and unconscious evaluative representations with similar content, while contending that well-known studies of pain in nonhuman animals are much less convincing. |
Abstract
Affective experience in nonhuman animals is of great interest for both theoretical and practical reasons. This paper highlights research by the psychologists Anthony Dickinson and Bernard Balleine which provides particularly good evidence of conscious affective experience in rats. This evidence is compelling because it implicates a sophisticated system for goal-directed action selection, and demonstrates a contrast between apparently conscious and unconscious evaluative representations with similar content. Meanwhile, the evidence provided by some well-known studies on pain in nonhuman animals is much less convincing. This comparison may offer lessons for the future study of animal consciousness.
Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- Assessing tests of animal consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2022
- The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case Frontiers in Psychology June 22, 2026
- Why the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed. Science and Engineering Ethics October 28, 2022
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