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Affective Experience and Evidence for Animal Consciousness

Patrick Butlin

Philosophical Topics 2020 DOI: 10.5840/philtopics20204816 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that research by Dickinson and Balleine provides particularly good evidence of conscious affective experience in rats, based on a sophisticated goal-directed action selection system and a contrast between apparently conscious and unconscious evaluative representations with similar content, while contending that well-known studies of pain in nonhuman animals are much less convincing.

Abstract

Affective experience in nonhuman animals is of great interest for both theoretical and practical reasons. This paper highlights research by the psychologists Anthony Dickinson and Bernard Balleine which provides particularly good evidence of conscious affective experience in rats. This evidence is compelling because it implicates a sophisticated system for goal-directed action selection, and demonstrates a contrast between apparently conscious and unconscious evaluative representations with similar content. Meanwhile, the evidence provided by some well-known studies on pain in nonhuman animals is much less convincing. This comparison may offer lessons for the future study of animal consciousness.

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