A Knowledge Argument Without “Knowledge”

The Knowledge Argument against physicalism holds that knowing all physical facts about color vision does not entail knowing what it is like to see red. This paper offers a variation called the Resemblance Argument, which shifts the focus from knowledge to representation. It argues that accurate mental representations of qualia (subjective experiences) require qualitative resemblance to the way those experiences are presented, whereas representations of physical states do not. Because popular physicalist responses to the Knowledge Argument—such as the Ability hypothesis, the Acquaintance hypothesis, and the New Knowledge of an Old Fact strategy—address knowledge rather than representation, they fail against this new argument. However, some physicalist responses, including Illusionism and the Incomplete Physical Knowledge Strategy, remain viable.

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Abstract

ABSTRACT I offer a variation on the Knowledge Argument, the “Resemblance Argument,” which argues that the accuracy conditions for representations of qualia require qualitative resemblance to the mode of presentation, whereas those for representations of physical states do not. The Resemblance Argument resists a number of popular current responses to the Knowledge Argument, including the Ability hypothesis, the Acquaintance hypothesis, and the “New Knowledge of an Old Fact” strategy. Because these responses focus on the concept of knowledge, but the Resemblance Argument makes no claims about knowledge, these responses fail. Some physicalist responses nonetheless survive the Resemblance Argument intact, including Illusionism and the Incomplete Physical Knowledge Strategy.