A Knowledge Argument Without “Knowledge”
Analytic Philosophy July 9, 2026 DOI: 10.1111/phib.70018 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Qualia Physicalism Argument complex analysis Focus optics Variation astronomy Epistemology Common knowledge logic Cognitive science |
| Key points | Argues that the accuracy conditions for representations of qualia require qualitative resemblance to the mode of presentation, unlike representations of physical states, and that this resists certain responses to the Knowledge Argument but not all physicalist responses. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT I offer a variation on the Knowledge Argument, the “Resemblance Argument,” which argues that the accuracy conditions for representations of qualia require qualitative resemblance to the mode of presentation, whereas those for representations of physical states do not. The Resemblance Argument resists a number of popular current responses to the Knowledge Argument, including the Ability hypothesis, the Acquaintance hypothesis, and the “New Knowledge of an Old Fact” strategy. Because these responses focus on the concept of knowledge, but the Resemblance Argument makes no claims about knowledge, these responses fail. Some physicalist responses nonetheless survive the Resemblance Argument intact, including Illusionism and the Incomplete Physical Knowledge Strategy.