Philosophy Journal
May 1, 2024
Igor F. Mikhailov
2 citations
Creating empirically based theories of consciousness faces two obstacles: the search for neural correlates lacks working hypotheses about their causal connection to conscious states, and there is insufficient evidence that all conscious phenomena are ontologically unified. These issues may stem from the sciences lacking an engineering-level analog, like the radio engineering level that bridges theoretical electrodynamics and device function. A computational approach, describing the subject as computational primitives generating conscious states, could fill this role, as non-computational theories remain metaphysical. The paper reviews a theory based on active inference, suggesting that a computational model underlying a good theory of consciousness should be probabilistic, not deterministic.
Philosophy Journal
May 22, 2018
Konstantin A. Pavlov-Pinus
1 citation
The text is a fragment composed of punctuation marks and isolated words, lacking coherent sentences or a discernible argument. It mentions concepts such as Dasein and references to philosophy, but does not provide enough connected content to summarize.
Philosophy Journal
December 2, 2025
Alexey Kuksyuk
Numbers, for philosopher Valerian Muravyov, are not mere abstractions but the foundation of both thought and reality, uniting the one and the many. Drawing on Pythagoreans, Neoplatonists, Leibniz, and Cantor, he developed a dialectical concept of plurality in which a number is a set containing all its subsets, leading to paradoxes about identity. The article examines Muravyov's attempt to create a new logical system to resolve paradoxes in naive set theory and publishes his chapter 'The Arithmetical Grounds' for the first time. His work is presented as an important contribution to Russian philosophy of mathematics.
Philosophy Journal
September 30, 2025
V. Sleptsova
A review of the 2025 Russian translation of Arthur Green's "Guide to the Book of Zohar" (2004), a concise introduction to Jewish mysticism originally published alongside the first English translation of the Zohar. The review notes that Green's work, while a significant contribution to Russian-language Jewish and religious studies, necessarily simplifies and schematizes its material—particularly the relationship between Jewish mysticism and philosophy—in order to present a holistic picture of the Zohar's history, context of creation, and main themes.
Philosophy Journal
May 1, 2024
Mikhail Sushchin
The science of consciousness should not pursue a single grand unified theory, as theoretical monism is inappropriate for both cognitive science and consciousness studies. Instead, the optimal explanatory strategy depends on the subject matter: cognitive science benefits from explanatory pluralism, while consciousness studies may require a unified approach. In the absence of theories that predict novel phenomena or explain known facts unexpectedly, empirical adequacy—not falsifiability—should be the primary criterion for assessing theories like computational models. Falsifiability remains a useful methodological principle but not a demarcation criterion or cure-all.
Philosophy Journal
April 2, 2026
Konstantin Yu. Burmistrov
Franz Joseph Molitor, a German philosopher and Hebraist, attempted to create a holistic doctrine of the historical process by blending Schelling's philosophy with concepts from Jewish mysticism (Kabbalah). He viewed human history as part of a universal sacred history centered on revelation as a continuous process. Molitor argued that scientific study of history is possible through a reliable tradition preserved most purely in Kabbalah. He rethought Christianity and Judaism's place in history, contending that Christian theology cannot achieve its goals without serious engagement with Jewish mystical tradition. The article includes a biography, a Russian translation of Molitor's book, and translations of letters.
Philosophy Journal
May 1, 2024
P. Baryshnikov
Computational models in philosophy of mind and empirical science face fundamental limitations that prevent them from correctly addressing the ontology of consciousness. The conceptual level of computational approaches cannot formulate questions about consciousness's nature, despite their empirical success. Computationalism in philosophical theories of consciousness is a practice of word usage that describes information properties of consciousness within methodological rules. Limitations include the lack of a scientific theory of subjectivity, irreducibility of external properties of consciousness to internal states, and fundamental restrictions from computer mathematics on completeness and consistency. The paper classifies anti-computational programs and discusses difficulties formalizing nonlinear processes, predicting emergent properties of autonomous systems, and limitations from non-standard computational processes. Set-theoretic reductive realism and p-adic number systems are considered as possible alternatives.
Philosophy Journal
May 1, 2024
Vadim V. Vasilyev
The paper examines Igor Mikhailov's proposals for improving empirical theories of consciousness, agreeing that such theories benefit from a computational level with real modeling potential and that their theses will be probabilistic. It disputes Mikhailov's interpretations of two contemporary works on criteria for successful empirical theories, specifically the compression criterion from Konstantin Anokhin and Anokhin's parameter "how". The paper argues that Mikhailov's falsifiability criterion requires clarification, transforming it into the concept of weak direct verifiability, because otherwise all theses could be considered falsifiable. Speculative theories of consciousness are defined as containing directly unverifiable propositions, but non-experimental theories need not be speculative; armchair theories can clarify consciousness's ontological status through conceptual analysis of folk ontology.